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Abstract
This article explores the rationale for protecting and
assisting refugees, from an ethical perspective. It also
examines the relationship between a country’s obligation to
provide asylum and that country’s affluence. The field of
tension between statist and cosmopolitan ethics is analyzed.
After showing that the former establishes weak and limited
asylum obligations and after offering a brief argument for
cosmopolitanism, the article explores cosmopolitan forms of
utilitarianism, libertarianism, and egalitarianism. A
reasonable synthesis of the last three perspectives is pro-
posed: it includes a strong duty to provide asylum, a broad
definition of the kinds of displacement that create entitle-
ments to international protection and assistance, and
international burden-sharing based on relative affluence.
Résumé
Cet article exploratoire se penche sur la raison d’être
fondamentale — du point de vue de l’éthique — de l’aide
et de la protection offertes aux réfugiés. Il examine ensuite
la relation qui existe entre le devoir d’asile d’un pays et son
niveau de richesse. Cette exploration se fait à l’intérieur de
l’espace de tension qui existe entre l’éthique étatiste et
l’éthique cosmopolite. L’article démontre que l’éthique
étatiste ne propose, dans le meilleur des cas, que des devoirs
faibles et limités. Il continue avec une brève plaidoirie pour
le cosmopolitisme, avant d’examiner les formes
cosmopolites de l’utilitarisme et des doctrines libertaires et
égalitaires. Une synthèse équitable est proposée, qui inclut le
devoir ferme d’offrir l’asile, une définition générale des
types de déracinements donnant droit à la protection et à
l’assistance internationales, et un système de partage des
charges au niveau international basé sur les niveaux relatifs
de richesse.
Introduction: Two Ethical Questions
What is the ethical basis for protecting and as-sisting refugees from other countries? Does acountry’s affluence affect its moral obligations?
These are the questions to be addressed in this article. The
focus is on the institution of asylum, not the current de-
bates about asylum policies and procedures. (The approach
sketched out here could be applied usefully to the latter,
but that would require a much longer treatment.)
The questions are ethical and require an ethical approach
to answer them. Such an approach must be distinguished
from a socio-scientific or legal approach. A socio-scientific
analysis describes and explains, e.g., how asylum is viewed
in particular countries or cultures and the reasons for this
attitude, such as the fact that a religion’s founding prophet
sought asylum at a crucial point in his messianic career.
Such an analysis is different from an evaluative and pre-
scriptive approach, which is shared by both ethics and the
law. The strictly legal approach, represented by legal posi-
tivism, is still, in one sense, descriptive: it articulates what
the law says and then applies it to a case in an evaluative or
prescriptive manner. Certain schools of ethics, such as the
school of natural law, do that, too, although what it initially
describes is not law made by people, but divine law. How-
ever, regardless of whether ethical schools take a “realist”
approach (which involves discovering ethical principles or
the ethical order) or a “constructivist” approach (which
recognizes that we human beings and our societies con-
struct ideas of the good and the right), the ethical approach
requires that laws and social practices be submitted to evalu-
ative scrutiny. This is the approach I will use in this essay
when exploring refugee protection and assistance. In other
words, I will not ask, Do certain refugee policies and prac-
tices accord with legally established rights and obligations?
Rather, my question will be, What form must refugee laws,
policies, and practices take in order to be ethical?
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I will evaluate competing ethical perspectives, especially
perspectives that differ on the ethical significance of na-
tional borders. And I will evaluate ideal types of ethical
perspectives. Most functioning systems are mixtures of ethi-
cal principles, and these ethical principles can often be
traced to different ideal types of coherent ethical perspec-
tives. So ideal types of ethical perspectives are seldom good
representations of functioning ethical systems. Further-
more, they seldom provide the most satisfactory prescrip-
tions. Nevertheless, to understand the rationales, it makes
sense to initially analyze such ideal types and then treat
particular instances of real-world prescriptions as hybrids
of such ideal types.
I have not yet defined the word refugee. In fact, I will
leave this definition open, because the implications of each
ethical perspective lead to different definitions, just as with
the term asylum. These implications need to be explored,
rather than defined away. What we can accept for the mo-
ment is that refugees are persons who have been forced to
leave their home area.
A further question arises about alternatives to asylum
and whether they should be pursued. Asylum is necessary
when people are forced to move. Are there ways of pre-
venting or minimizing such displacement? Should they be
pursued as alternatives to asylum or merely to minimize
the need for it? One option is humanitarian intervention
and the creation of safe havens for threatened populations.
Temporary asylum in neighbouring countries may also be
a way of minimizing displacement and the requirements
of asylum. Each ethical perspective has a different view on
such approaches.
Finally, before proceeding to the actual analysis, it may
be important to acknowledge that the following treatment
of asylum is Eurocentric. Not Eurocentric in the way that
the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the establishment of
the office of the un High Commissioner for Refugees was,
when it limited itself to refugees in Europe and ignored
mass refugee problems elsewhere. Asylum needs and rights
in the whole world are addressed here. Rather, an allega-
tion of Eurocentrism could be made because the range of
ideas employed, including those of cosmopolitanism, are
drawn from thinking in the North Atlantic sphere and its
intellectual culture. That, no doubt, is true. However, there
is no single Western value system. Rather, the North Atlan-
tic cultural sphere has been a terrain for struggle among
competing value principles and systems. The analysis pre-
sented here certainly cannot be taken to represent a main-
stream position, especially its cosmopolitan dimension
explained below. Similarly, there is no one system of Asian
or African values. In fact, even national cultures typically
are arenas in which competing values are in contention. It
is not unreasonable to suppose that the range of values in
contention in the West or the North is not unlike the range
of values in the East or the South. What is offered here as
an ethical analysis is intended as a contribution to a global
dialogue about the ethics of asylum. It is to engage, not to
pronounce. It would be very enlightening to place this
analysis in a dialectic with, for example, Islamic, neo-
Confucian or African perspectives on asylum.
Sovereigntist Ethics and Refugees
The most conventional ethical perspective holds that the
relevant community for ethical considerations is the na-
tional community within which ethical obligations hold,
but that certain limited ethical requirements also apply to
relations with outsiders. It involves three levels of obliga-
tions: (1) It recognizes strong moral obligations, such as
duties of mutual aid, only to co-citizens. (2) It normally
requires that as long as aliens enter a country legally and
respect the laws and customs of that society in other ways,
they should be treated with civility. (3) Obligations towards
other countries and citizens in those countries are limited
to those of non-intervention, and merely require that their
sovereignty be respected. I will therefore refer to this form
of international ethics as sovereigntism.1
Focusing on duties to refugees, what is crucial is that
international obligations under sovereigntism are limited
to non-intervention. That means first of all that victims of
persecution, repression, or general violence cannot be pro-
tected or helped on the territory of their home country.
They have to flee across their country’s border in order for
help to be permissible. However, even then, under strict
sovereigntism, protection and assistance are not required.
Since they are not citizens of the country they flee to, they
have, under sovereigntism, no moral claim to help, although
as a matter of charity or hospitality such help may be extended.
When international intervention is necessary in order
to avert the need for flight, sovereigntism allows it only in
a non-coercive form. So it can take the form of diplomacy
and perhaps even economic inducements, but it cannot
involve invasions of the kind undertaken in the 1970s by
India into East Pakistan, Tanzania into Uganda, or Viet-
nam into Cambodia, all of which were initiated at least
partly to prevent further atrocities by states against their
own people. All these actions involved violations of sover-
eignty. (Whether economic sanctions violate sovereignty
is a matter of contention; according to international law,
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Asylum, Internationalism, and Communitarianism
Although there are certain sections in state elites that still
adhere to unqualified sovereigntism, international law since
World War ii has moved beyond it in several ways. Inter-
national human rights, incorporated in international trea-
ties, are qualifications to sovereigntism. One such right is a
right to asylum, in the form of a prohibition of the forced
return of those who have reached foreign territory and can
claim individual persecution (non-refoulement). It is a lim-
ited right, because it does not include a clear right to entry
and does not apply to other forms of victimization, such as
by general rather than specifically targeted violence. It is
true that many states assure such entry and accept broader
criteria, but such criteria are not part of formal interna-
tional law. Another non-sovereigntist aspect of interna-
tional law finds that foreign intervention is both permissible
and required when victimization takes the form of geno-
cide. Unfortunately, international law is only “soft law,” in
that it is not backed by an agency with clear responsibility
and capacity to enforce it, and, given that intervention is
costly and hazardous, the prevention of genocide is not
assured, as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda made evident. That
international law is merely soft law places it between nor-
mal law and ethics. Like normal law, it has been formally
codified, but, like ethics, it is backed by conscience and
moral pressure rather than authoritative enforcement.
The right to asylum represents a deviation from the ideal
type of sovereigntist ethics. The sovereign-state system is
one solution to the problem of international or inter-state
relations or, more broadly, relations between peoples. The
problem at issue is the potential for conflict to become war.
The sovereign-state system, which Europe adopted in the
1600s, as an alternative to the Habsburgs’ defeated impe-
rial approach to maintaining international order, vests su-
preme authority in states, and foregoes any supervening
authority that might restrain the exercise of that supreme
authority of states. There are internal arrangements that
impose such restraints, such as the institutions of repre-
sentative democracy, of checks and balances between the
different branches of government, and of federalism. How-
ever, the sovereign-state system, which emerged in Europe
when states were mostly authoritarian, imposed no such re-
straints on states. For a state elite to be internationally rec-
ognized as legitimate, it was necessary only to demonstrate
that it exercised its authority effectively. That it exercised
its authority responsibly was not a requirement. Repres-
sion, exploitation, and even genocide are not violations of
sovereignty when interpreted as autonomy among states.
There is, however, one argument that accepts the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, but that nevertheless provides for a
limited extension of international obligations beyond non-
intervention. The sovereigntist system does produce cer-
tain benefits, such as preventing or limiting war—a highly
dubious proposition in light of the system’s historical per-
formance—but it also has widely recognized disadvantages.
In particular, it fails to protect citizens against rapacious
behaviour by their own governors, other than through
whatever internal institutions that the citizenry has won
or been granted. With the institution of asylum, and more
specifically by establishing a right to asylum, the system
minimizes this disadvantage. It means that, as long as vic-
tims of repressive states can reach foreign territory, they
can escape victimization. While this argument for an obli-
gation to grant asylum emerges from a particular under-
standing of the sovereign-state system, it goes beyond strict
sovereigntism. It means that there are international obli-
gations other than merely that of non-intervention. To ac-
knowledge this difference, I will refer to the ethics that
recognizes the rights and duties of asylum as internation-
alism, to distinguish it from sovereigntism.2
Another perspective—one that is closely related to
sovereigntism and may also provide a moral basis for asy-
lum—is communitarianism. The point of departure for
moral thinking has sometimes been to equate the moral
community with the state-nation (a term used here in rec-
ognition of the fact that nations are typically created by
states, rather than the reverse). But the point of departure
is the ethno-cultural community as the moral community.
The ethno-cultural community is the generator of values.
It defines define the community that naturally recognizes
these values. And most important, it is morally fundamen-
tal because it is entitled to be protected against destruc-
tion, erosion, and intrusion. According to communi-
tarianism, states are entitled to sovereignty to the extent
that they represent such communities. (Ideal nation-states
involve a coincidence of the state-nation and the ethno-
cultural community. In reality, even countries that come
close to this situation—Japan or Bangladesh—contain
ethno-cultural minorities.) When states victimize certain
communities or fundamentally violate their values, they
no longer represent such communities. Thus, while
communitarianism leads to a presumption of the primacy
of sovereignty, such a presumption is conditional and can
lead to the right to call on international assistance in a strug-
gle to protect communities against victimization or viola-
tion by the state. A minimal form of such assistance is to
receive and protect refugees that come from such commu-
nities. Furthermore, communities often have the moral
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obligation of hospitality as part of their inherited values.
However, this value varies with cultures and can be quite
closely circumscribed, as when it applies to ethnic kin only.
It may not guarantee refuge to all asylum-seekers.
Communitarianism can thus provide for asylum either on
the basis of the value of hospitality (which is variable and
unreliable) or on the basis of the universal value of the pri-
macy of communities.3
Nevertheless, under either internationalism or com-
munitarianism, traditional conceptions of asylum do not
require states to treat refugees in the same way they treat
their own citizens. There are citizen rights and there are
refugee rights, and the two are not the same. This is a re-
flection of a two-level ethic: one applies within the society
that refugees are not part of, and the second applies across
the boundaries of society to strangers, including refugees.
In other words, first, there is national ethics, with extensive
specific rights and duties, as well as the more general right
to have one’s interests included in the public interest, which
it is the duty of the state to advance. Then there is interna-
tional ethics with much more limited entitlements and
obligations.
The second question posed in this essay is, Does a coun-
try’s affluence or poverty make a difference to its interna-
tional obligations? This question is important in two
respects: the amount of assistance that the host country
owes to refugees who have taken asylum within its bor-
ders, and the amount of assistance that non-host coun-
tries owe to host countries. Clearly, given that asylum is
granted at least to save lives, assistance to refugees must be
sufficient to ensure their survival. The general orientations
of internationalism and communitarianism in themselves,
however, provide no guidelines for the living conditions to
be assured to refugees; there is no requirement that these
living conditions be in some way comparable to the living
conditions in the host country. Nor do these ethical per-
spectives imply the need for other countries to share the
burden. Of course, on both these issues it is possible to add
to the general ethical perspectives certain particular ethi-
cal judgments that answer the question, but such judgments
would be simply ad hoc supplements rather than integral
parts of the ethical perspectives. This suggests the need to
look at an ethical perspective, or framework, that does gen-
erate answers to these questions from within itself.
Cosmopolitanism and Asylum Obligations
That perspective is cosmopolitanism. It is the major alter-
native to both sovereigntism and communitarianism. In-
ternationalism is a position between sovereigntism and
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism treats all of human-
ity as part of one moral community, without distinguish-
ing between compatriots and foreigners. Whatever moral
obligations we have to other persons, we have to all other
persons, regardless of nationality. States have institutional
significance, but they do not define moral communities.
Borders do not represent the limits to general moral con-
cerns. States are, of course, important in that they are the
collective and authoritative agents of their citizens. This
means that they assume moral obligations that citizens can
meet only collectively or that are best met collectively.4
This applies both to granting asylum and to meeting
long-distance obligations to refugee protection and assist-
ance. It is true that asylum can be granted individually, to
the extent that the law allows individual refugees to enter if
they have been invited to do so by individual citizens, as in
the case of refugee sponsorship. However, that is unlikely
to fulfill the full range of obligations to refugees, given that
the need for asylum does not derive from prior cross-bor-
der personal relations and given further that such need may
not be adequately met by the charitable behaviour of host-
country citizens. Presently, the burden of asylum typically
falls on poor countries, and an equitable sharing of the
burden of providing for the migration, settlement, and es-
tablishment costs of refugees is best assured through state
action, either through the resettlement of refugees from
countries with a disproportionate share of refugees or
through international assistance.
There are arguments that support a cosmopolitan ap-
proach. Without attempting to be comprehensive, two of
these arguments briefly are as follows. (1) Global integra-
tion of economies, cultures, and polities has proceeded to
such an extent that mutual vulnerability is now worldwide.
As a result of this integration, the relevant moral commu-
nity has thus become humanity as a whole. (2) The earth
and its resources cannot justifiably be appropriated merely
by occupying a piece of land and claiming either owner-
ship or sovereignty over it. Even if the original occupancy
of land that is not used by other people warrants occu-
pancy rights that can be bequeathed and traded in perpe-
tuity, regardless of the scarcity that this creates for others,
in this or in subsequent generations, there is another ob-
jection. It is that the history of the acquisition of land and
territory is filled with conquest, violence, fraud, and ex-
ploitation—including that through colonialism—so that
the moral basis of land titles and territorial boundaries is
very much in question. This is not to say that land owner-
ship or territorial state authority cannot be justified, but
merely that they cannot be treated as absolute and that other
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moral obligations may impinge on them or constrain them.
Under cosmopolitanism such moral obligations can arise
from considerations that cut across borders.5
In international politics the most obvious expression of
cosmopolitanism has been the quite remarkable develop-
ment and codification of international human rights in the
last half-century. The right to asylum is part of this set of
human rights. The following discussion, however, will not
focus on human rights for two reasons. One is that many
international human rights are not actually cross-border
rights, but merely internationally recognized rights of citi-
zens in relation to their respective states. In that form, they
are not cosmopolitan in the full sense. By contrast, the asy-
lum right, which consists of a right of foreigners in rela-
tion to host states, is fully cosmopolitan. But there is a
second reason. It is that there is a great variety of human
rights, and they derive from different ethical perspectives
that provide their rationale.6 It is upon these underlying
ethical perspectives that I will focus instead. These are all
accommodated within the cosmopolitan approach, which
provides only a particular ethical frame by requiring that
people outside one’s borders be entitled to the same moral
consideration as people within those borders. What this
moral consideration amounts to depends on the ethical
perspective that applies within this cosmopolitan frame.
Just as within the nationalist or sovereigntist frame differ-
ent ethical perspectives compete and vary in their implica-
tions for the nature of moral obligations towards
compatriots, so different ethical or social-justice perspec-
tives are compatible with the cosmopolitan frame. In fact,
the perspectives that compete within the former frame are
applicable within the latter.
My approach will be to identify three such different per-
spectives, to show their implications for refugee protection
and assistance in a cosmopolitan frame and to explore
whether a synthesis of the three is plausible. The three per-
spectives are (1) libertarianism, (2) utilitarianism, and (3)
egalitarianism. An international human-rights regime can
derive from any one of these three, as long as whatever is to
be maximized—liberty, utility, or equality—is not pursued
simply from one policy to the next but is institutionalized
as a set of rights that accomplishes that aim. Alternatively,
and more commonly, it is pursued as a policy goal that is
constrained by a set of rights in order to prevent abuses or
mistakes that negate the long-term maximization of the
particular goal. The actual international human-rights re-
gime of today is very much a mixture of the three ethical
perspectives.7 The approach here will be to articulate the
three positions, briefly explore their respective strengths
and weaknesses, and develop a reasonable synthesis.8
First, I will sketch the main ideas of the three ethical
perspectives.9
Libertarianism holds that it is the individual who is sov-
ereign, that her freedom, interpreted as freedom from in-
terference by others, including in particular the use and
enjoyment of her property, is to be maximally advanced by
protecting certain rights, and that the greatest threat to such
freedom comes from the agent of the collectivity, the state.
Utilitarianism consists of the simple position that hu-
man well-being (or the well-being of all sentient beings)
should be maximized.
Egalitarianism advocates the minimization of inequali-
ties. There is, however, a fair amount of disagreement within
egalitarianism about which good or dimension is to be
equalized. For our purposes, I will take it to be first sur-
vival chances, then life prospects. Sometimes the principle
of equality and the principle of need are taken to be at odds
with each other, because different people have different
needs, and the needs principle therefore requires the dif-
ferential treatment of people. But to present this as an op-
position or divergence between the two principles is
mistaken. Needs can reasonably be taken to be whatever
people require in order not to be disadvantaged, relative to
others. To provide a paraplegic person with a wheelchair—
to which a normally mobile person is not entitled—is sim-
ply to reduce the inequality in mobility between the two.
So differential need fulfillment serves equality. I will there-
fore deal with needs under egalitarianism.
One difficulty in any discussion of cosmopolitan ethics
is that, unless the prescription is for a revolution to create
a cosmopolitan world with appropriate institutions, it has
to provide prescriptions for a world with essentially
sovereigntist institutions. This is very much reflected in the
upcoming discussion of asylum. Presumably cosmo-
politanism would prescribe open borders, so the function
of borders would be confined to delineating political juris-
dictions with their legal, regulatory, and service systems,
where these systems cannot be used to exclude individuals.
Open borders would, of course, make asylum in its strict
sense redundant, although refugees might still need pro-
tection in the form of assistance. The discussion that fol-
lows will explore the implications of cosmopolitan
perspectives on asylum when the cosmopolitan prescrip-
tion of open borders has not been accepted. In other words,
the cosmopolitan prescription of asylum obligations is, from




Libertarianism is analogous to sovereigntism: the central
focus is on non-intervention. In sovereigntism, non-inter-
vention is applied to relations between states, in libertari-
anism to relations between individuals, and to relations
between institutions (such as the state) and individuals.
There are obligations not to interfere in the private sphere
of others, but no obligations to assist. Providing assistance
to the needy may be morally admirable, but it is not re-
quired, because such a requirement would interfere with
the liberty of the providers. Under strict libertarianism, the
need to avoid interfering would appear to apply to asylum
as well. Libertarians do not argue, for example, that indi-
viduals are morally required to assist those who have been
repressed by a national government. However, libertarian-
ism does recognize authoritarianism as an evil. Moreover,
it allows that, when freedoms conflict, some freedoms are
sacrificed to others, e.g., judicial coercion is accepted and
found necessary in order to protect individuals against force
and fraud. When cosmopolitan libertarianism recognizes
that victimization by foreign authoritarianism requires the
same moral attention as domestic authoritarianism, such
recognition can lead to an obligation to provide asylum. In
this way, an argument for asylum on the basis of the viola-
tion of one’s civil rights can flow from cosmopolitan liber-
tarianism, although it does not inevitably follow.
Entitlement can be taken to represent a variant of cosmo-
politan libertarianism. Does this mean that, under this vari-
ant, rich countries have greater obligations than poor
countries? There seems to be nothing in libertarianism, even
of the cosmopolitan kind, to indicate that they do, nor that
rich countries have obligations to poor countries that carry
the bulk of the asylum burden.11
Cosmopolitanism Utilitarianism
Cosmopolitan utilitarianism requires that the well-being
of humanity be maximized. Is it advanced by the right to
asylum? The most plausible position is that it is. The sacri-
fices (losses of well-being) made by those who must pro-
vide asylum will normally be considerably outweighed by
the gains in well-being of those who thus find refuge from
repression. In fact, under cosmopolitan utilitarianism this
conclusion applies to quite a wide definition of refugee.
The well-being of humanity will be advanced by establish-
ing the right to asylum for those whose survival is threat-
ened by general violence (without being specific targets of
persecution), famine, or other forms of environmental dis-
aster, i.e., those who are forced to leave because of a well-
founded fear for their lives as a result of state failures.12 This
means that, from the perspective of cosmopolitan utilitari-
anism, the restriction of asylum rights by the 1951 Geneva
Convention to victims of persecution is much too narrow.
It does not mean, however, that the obligation to provide
asylum is unlimited. The limit is reached when the effort
to provide asylum costs more, in terms of human lives, than
the lives saved by the provision of asylum. Such a limit,
however, would be reached only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as when famine refugees flee into a country
that is also experiencing food shortages. (Even then, the
obligation, rather than ending, shifts to other countries.)
In general, cosmopolitan utilitarianism prescribes asylum
obligations that are much more generous than those that
are currently prevalent.
This raises the question of burden-sharing and the rel-
evance of affluence and poverty. On the one hand, the limit
to the obligation to assist refugees is more quickly reached
in poor countries than in rich ones. So rich countries
should, from this ethical perspective, be the ones to be called
upon to respond to the asylum rights of refugees in the
first instance. On the other hand, an implication of maxi-
mizing well-being is that costs should be minimized at the
same time. Costs represent losses in well-being in that they
reflect the use of resources that could have been used to
pursue other opportunities to enhance well-being, e.g.,
providing for agricultural irrigation for peasants in the host
society. This means that, when several options accomplish
the same gains in well-being for refugees, the least-cost
option should be chosen. These two considerations open
the door to a complex set of issues that is beyond the scope
of this paper to fully pursue. I will confine myself to some
brief points about the implications of cosmopolitan utili-
tarianism.
 (1) Refugee protection that maximizes well-being, i.e.,
asylum provision that does the most for refugee protec-
tion and assistance at minimum cost, is usually provided
in neighbouring countries. Refugees benefit because their
transportation costs are limited, and they are more likely
to find ecological, cultural, and economic environments
with which they are relatively familiar. And the required
assistance is seldom expensive. Refugees are also relatively
close for their eventual return, which then remains rela-
tively inexpensive. In other words, the proximity of asy-
lum to the home of the refugees is typically an advantage
when applying the utilitarian criterion.
(2) If the need for asylum is temporary, the provision of
asylum may not need to be permanent. In other words,
refugees may be required to return when the reasons for
the displacement have been removed.13 If and when war-
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ranted, the return may be accomplished by the withdrawal
of assistance rather than direct coercion. In contrast to the
libertarian, for whom coercion is to be minimized, the utili-
tarian is concerned about only the effects of coercion upon
well-being. But the utilitarian will generally value a mini-
mally coercive approach to return. It is not that the with-
drawal of assistance is not coercive, but it is less coercive
than outright expulsion. At the same time, if the refugees
have been away from home for a long time, it may no longer
be home to them, other than in a nostalgic sense, and a
mandated return could involve extensive suffering, while
the host society may not benefit from their departure be-
cause the activities of the refugees have over time become
tightly integrated into the host economy. This, too, would
need to be taken into account in a utilitarian perspective.
 (3) Preventing displacement will often be a more effec-
tive strategy for maximizing well-being than merely accom-
modating the refugees. Prevention can include a wide range
of measures that are open to a cosmopolitan, including
those that violate state sovereignty, such as mounting an
invasion to prevent atrocities, to end a civil war, or to cre-
ate safe havens. (An invasion might even be necessary to
allow people who are trapped to become refugees.) Utili-
tarianism is a consequentialist ethic, which is to say that
the justification of actions depends on the outcomes, in-
cluding unintended ones. Side effects are therefore impor-
tant and have to be considered. Whether preventive
intervention is justified will therefore depend on the whole
complex range of consequences. This also applies to non-
coercive prevention of displacement. If flight is due to fam-
ine and the lack of assistance within the home country, and
could be averted by the provision of international assist-
ance, then assistance rather than asylum will be cost-effective.
In other words, emergency assistance can be an alternative
to asylum and will typically be preferable from a utilitar-
ian perspective. It, as well as safe havens, can also assist those
who have not been able to cross borders—the internally
displaced.
 (4) Actually, the element that utilitarianism wishes to
maximize is overall well-being, not its distribution. At this
very simple level, then, there are no obligations for rich
countries to share the burden of poor countries that pro-
vide asylum. However, one form of utilitarianism is based
on the assumption that a certain amount of money (or,
more generally, control of resources for living) in the hands
of someone who already has much will produce less well-
being than the same amount of money for someone who
has little. Thus, transferring $1000 from a rich person to a
poor person will increase the well-being of the poor per-
son by more than it will reduce the well-being of the rich
person. There is thus a utilitarian (maximization of well-
being) argument for redistribution from the rich to the
poor, including across borders and to refugees. This ver-
sion of utilitarianism slides substantially into egalitarian-
ism and I will turn to that ethical perspective now.14
Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism
Cosmopolitan egalitarianism is concerned with distribu-
tion worldwide. Global inequalities are to be minimized.
While different formulations are concerned with different
dimensions of people’s lives that are to be fully equalized
(well-being, purchasing power, opportunities, etc.), in the
case of asylum it can be taken to be personal security and
the means of survival. Moreover, in the area of distribu-
tion between countries, the relevant dimension will be
something like gross domestic product (gdp) and the avail-
ability of land and other accessible natural resources. The
first implication of cosmopolitan egalitarianism is that
people who lack the security of survival are one of the most
deprived groups. Providing such security, including that
achieved through asylum, is then a top priority for cosmo-
politan egalitarians, and practically all other concerns take
second place to it.
Of course, for cosmopolitan egalitarianism the agenda
goes much further and involves the elimination of all sig-
nificant inequalities. Without pursuing this radical vision
here, there is one other implication of this perspective that
is relevant to the issue of asylum and that is that of bur-
den-sharing. The most obvious form of burden-sharing is
the distribution of refugee admissions equally among coun-
tries. However, such a prescription is neither clear nor nec-
essarily best, even from an egalitarian perspective. First,
what does it mean to distribute refugee admissions equally?
Strict equality, regardless of the size of the country certainly
does not make sense. If it means some kind of proportion-
ality, is this in relation to the existing population or to the
geographic size of the country? And surely the affluence or
poverty of countries is relevant as well. Even if a suitable
formula could be worked out, it is not clear that the bur-
den of asylum is best distributed through the distribution
of refugee admissions. Given the earlier discussion under
utilitarianism, it might well make most sense to ask the
neighbouring countries to accommodate the refugees, to
the extent that they can, but to have the relatively rich coun-
tries pay for the resources, provisions, and services required
by the refugees. Egalitarianism requires the minimization
of inequalities. Financial burden-sharing is promoted by
the venerable public-finance principle of ability to pay. The
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poor don’t pay, and contributions are levied according to
the level of affluence. This requires a more progressive cri-
terion than, for example, the development assistance tar-
get of 0.7 per cent of gdp, which is analogous to a flat tax
rate. Like progressive taxation, it requires progressive lev-
ies for assistance to refugees. The ideal cosmopolitan ap-
proach would be the taxation of individuals according to
their income and wealth. In the absence of appropriate cos-
mopolitan institutions, the next best approach is a system
of progressive levies on countries. The fundamental point
here is that, under cosmopolitan egalitarianism, affluence
and poverty are highly relevant to the matter of sharing
the burden of asylum duties.
It might be objected that sending money rather than
accepting refugees is not an acceptable form of burden-
sharing. However, unless refugees are accepted in the rich
countries in the large numbers in which they appear—an
implausible prospect in light of the problems of cultural
and economic integration—a policy of selecting a small
proportion of refugees for resettlement in the rich coun-
tries simply introduces a serious element of inequality into
the refugee community, between those who are resettled
and those who are left behind, often in conditions of seri-
ous deprivation. Resettlement tends to be much more an
immigration policy than a refugee protection and assist-
ance policy. This point applies even more to those who have
the means to reach the territory of rich countries in order
to claim asylum there, supported by the territorial laws that
may then apply to them. For a cosmopolitan egalitarian,
the refugees entitled to protection and assistance are those
confined in miserable refugee camps. They tend to be out
of the sight of pressure groups and are easily forgotten. As
for the right to claim asylum by entering a rich country,
that must be protected, but more on grounds such as that
of hospitality, a value held particularly by communitarians,
and on grounds that it is a step towards open borders, which
is a long-term aim of cosmopolitans.15 But there should be
no illusion that it does much to advance global distribu-
tive justice.
Constructing a Cosmopolitan Position on Asylum
Instead of engaging in a careful critique of each of these
perspectives, I will treat them all as being ethically illumi-
nating and as offering potential building blocks for a more
complex cosmopolitan position. Libertarianism focuses on
self-determination, utilitarianism on the public interest,
and egalitarianism on distributive justice. How should this
cosmopolitan position now be constructed? The need for
asylum reflects the lack of cosmopolitan institutions, such
as global protection of human rights and open borders. If
such institutions were in place, their fallibility might still
make asylum necessary. A cosmopolitan case for asylum is
thus paradoxical: it is a prescription for a non-cosmopoli-
tan, pre-cosmopolitan, or inadequately cosmopolitan
world. As such, the argument and prescription must con-
sider the dangers and the limits of the existing world. The
dangers are repression, violence, and the failure of states to
protect their citizens. The limits, from a cosmopolitan per-
spective, are the lack or insufficiency of international con-
straints on the exercise of state authority, the existence of
border controls, and the lack of reliable mechanisms of in-
ternational redistribution and of other international sup-
ports for states to protect and assist their citizens. This lack
of institutions and hard law across state borders means that
cosmopolitanism is, at least for the time being, confined to
the observance of ethical norms in state policy and their
progressive incorporation in the soft law of international
treaties. As such, it still faces an uphill struggle against the
incumbency of the old sovereigntist ethic.
Just as in national politics we treat the public interest as
a—in fact the—central criterion for public policy, it is
equally warranted to do so in a cosmopolitan perspective.
That makes utilitarianism the starting point. At the same
time, egalitarianism comes in as a distributive criterion,
and libertarianism typically provides certain constraints in
the form of rights. In this discussion of asylum rights and
duties, however, libertarianism turns out to largely rein-
force what is already prescribed by the other perspectives.
This then makes the utilitarian argument central. The
crucial parts of this argument are the following: (1) Asy-
lum is important to the global public interest and is to be
instituted in a strong form, not merely as a right not to be
returned to the country of origin, but also as a right of
entry to other countries in the first place. (2) Refugees—
those entitled to asylum—should be defined in much
broader terms than those who have been persecuted and
should include those victimized by violence, famine, and
disasters. (3) Asylum is to be provided with adequate as-
sistance, but also at least cost. The balance is to be struck
globally rather than in relation to local conditions, given
the cosmopolitan frame at work. (4) The least-cost ap-
proach can mean that asylum is provided largely in neigh-
bouring countries. (5) The least-cost approach may mean
no more than temporary asylum in many cases. (6) The
least-cost approach also requires that measures to prevent
or minimize displacement, including humanitarian or pre-
ventive intervention, need to be considered first and that
can also minimize the need for asylum.
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Furthermore, egalitarianism generates two further
propositions: (7) The dangers and deprivations of refugees
are so important that their protection comes before prac-
tically all other concerns. (8) Progressive levies to distrib-
ute the burden of providing asylum on the basis of
international ability to pay are essential. They are not only
required by international social justice, but are also crucial
to prevent the institution of asylum from being eroded by
the financial self-defence of poor countries excessively bur-
dened by asylum demands. Overburdened poor countries
may be pushed to contain costs by restricting entry, forc-
ing refugees out of the country, and leaving refugee camps
poorly provided for.
Finally, on grounds that can be supported by all three
perspectives, including cosmopolitan libertarianism in
particular, there is one other ethical requirement related to
asylum, which, like emergency assistance, can be a conceiv-
able alternative to it. (9) In cases of genocide or other forms
of life-threatening state repression, such as deliberate fam-
ine, the “community of states”—namely the United Na-
tions, which is all that we now have to institutionally
represent humanity as a whole—is required to undertake
coercive intervention, including military invasion by a mul-
tilaterally authorized force. Of course, this does presup-
pose that alternative preventive efforts are ineffective or too
harmful (e.g., long-term economic sanctions, which weigh
most heavily on the innocent or even the victims) and that
the negative consequences of such intervention are not
likely to be worse than its gains.
Conclusion
Strict sovereigntism does not provide for asylum obliga-
tions. Communitarianism and internationalism can pro-
vide a basis for asylum obligations, but the basis for the
quality of asylum as well as for burden-sharing is uncer-
tain and typically grafted on ad hoc. Cosmopolitanism, at
least in the form of the mix of ethical perspectives articu-
lated here—based primarily on cosmopolitan utilitarian-
ism, qualified by egalitarianism, and reinforced by
cosmopolitan libertarianism—provides for a strong obli-
gation to provide asylum. Cosmopolitan utilitarianism in-
cludes admission in the first place, is quite broad in its
interpretation in that the qualification for asylum includes
a well-founded fear for one’s life due to general violence,
famine, and disasters, and requires countries to share the
burden of asylum, based on the respective national ability
to pay.
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